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This article analyzes an important dilemma that raises liability and
ethical concerns: Attorney conflicts of interest in the specialized setting of
corporate acquisitions and mergers.' The ensuing discussion seeks to
present a concrete analysis in conjunction with a recommended framework
of attorney conflicts of interest in the publicly-held corporate acquisition
context. First, the article will present a general overview of conflicts of
interest for the corporate counsel. Second, these conflicts issues will be
addressed in the corporate takeover setting, followed by an examination of
such conflicts in parent-subsidiary mergers and leveraged buyouts in which
incumbent management obtains a substantial equity interest in the entity.
Third, the article will focus on counsel's conflicts of interest in the
corporate acquisition context when advising committees of the board of
directors.2 Thereafter, the substantive impact of various procedural
* Radford Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. I thank Mr. Christopher
McGreal for his research assistance. Copyright 2005 © by Marc I. Steinberg. This article is
derived from Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Acquisitions, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1988). Copyright © 1988 by Hastings College of Law; reprinted with
permission.
1. See, e.g., MARC I. STEINBERG, LAWYERING AND ETHICS FOR THE BUSINESS ATTORNEY
57-69 (2002); MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND

STATE ENFORCEMENT §§ 10: 16-:22 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2004); see sources cited infra note 2.
2.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: CONFLICTS OF

INTEREST § 131 cmt. h (2000). See generally Barry S. Alberts & Samuel Thompson, Jr., Ethical
Issues Faced by Lawyers and Investment Bankers in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Problem

SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:3

mechanisms will be explored.
I.

OVERVIEW

From a general perspective, an attorney's general conflict-of-interest
responsibilities under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules") are governed by Rule 1.7.3 Under that rule, counsel must not
represent a client if a disabling conflict of interest is present.4 When a
concurrent conflict of interest exists, 5 counsel may undertake (or continue)
the representation if certain specified conditions are met. 6 For example,
when representation of multiple parties is involved in the transactional
setting, dual representation is generally permitted, provided that (1) the
lawyer discusses the concurrent conflict and its ramifications with each
affected party, (2) counsel reasonably believes that competent and diligent
Approach and Report of Panel Discussion, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 697, 698 (2000) (discussing the
topic, as the title suggests, "through the use of a hypothetical problem that raises issues in both
private and public company transactions"); Rita Henley Jenson, Deals May Backfire for Firms,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 1 (discussing potential liability of in-house lawyers based on the
conflicts of interest arising from their roles in corporate acquisitions); Susanna M. Kim, Dual
Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in Corporate Representation, 68
TENN. L. REV. 179 (2001) (examining, from professional responsibility, corporate governance and
theoretical perspectives, whether a corporate attorney should be allowed to serve on a client's
board of directors).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2004). The vast majority of states have
adopted some version of the Model Rules. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 13 (8th ed. 2003) ("[A]s of 2002, over forty-two
jurisdictions had revised their own rules to follow the 1983 Model Rules in substantial part.");
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 116 (4th ed. 2004).
By the close of the [twentieth] century, about four-fifths of the states and the District of
Columbia had adopted the Model Rules in large part, although with changes in certain
substantive provisions, particularly the rules governing confidentiality. Other
jurisdictions, including New York, retained the [Model] Code, sometimes with
significant modification.
Id. See generally N. Gregory Smith, Missed Opportunities:Louisiana's Version of the Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, 61 LA. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing Louisiana's decision about whether to
adopt Model Rules). Reference to the Model Rules in this article serves as a convenient method to
assess counsel's general responsibilities in addressing conflict-of-interest dilemmas.
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 28 (2004) (stating that "[w]hether a
conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances [and that] [f]or example, a lawyer may not
represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each
other").
5. Under Model Rule 1.7(a), a concurrent conflict of interest is present if either the
attorney's representation of a client will be directly adverse to a different client or a significant
risk exists that the lawyer's representation'of one or more clients "will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest
of the lawyer." Id. 1.7(a)(2).
6. See id. 1.7 cmts. 2, 4, 6-8, 18, 20.
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representation will be provided to each such party, 7and (3) each affected
party "gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.",
A number of other Model Rules address particular situations in which
conflicts of interest may arise for the corporate practitioner. For example,
Rule 1.9 addresses the issue of subsequent representation in a substantially
related matter in which the prospective client's interest is materially adverse
to the interest of a prior client.8 Rule 1.11(b) focuses on the imputed

disqualification of a law firm and the propriety of "screening" mechanisms
when a former government attorney becomes associated with a firm that
represents a client in a matter in which the former government attorney
participated while serving with the government. 9 As a last example, Rule

1.13(g) deals with the propriety of counsel simultaneously representing the
corporation and defendant corporate fiduciaries in a shareholders' derivative
action.1°
Neither the Model Rules nor other codified rules of conduct, however,
expressly focus on counsel's ethical responsibilities in the corporate
acquisition setting." Given the relative frequency and the high financial

stakes of these transactions, that omission is unfortunate. The dearth of2

judicial case law addressing

this subject compounds the problem.'

7. Id. 1.7(b). In order to engage in or continue the dual representation, such representation
must not be prohibited by law. Id. 1.7(b)(2). In addition, the prospective multiple representations
must not involve the bringing of a claim by a client against another client of the subject attorney in
the identical litigation or in any other matter before a tribunal. Id. 1.7(b)(3). The term "informed
consent" is defined in Rule 1.0(e) to denote "the agreement by a person to a proposed course of
conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." Id.
1.0(e).
8. Id. 1.9(a). In order to engage in such representation, counsel must procure the former
client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. Id. See generally Richard W. Painter, Advance
Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289 (2000) (discussing the circumstances in which
lawyers and clients should be able to contractually regulate future conflicts of interest).
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (b). See generally Grant Dawson, Working
Guidelinesfor Successive Conflicts of Interest Involving Government and PrivateEmployment, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 329 (1998) (discussing current rules governing lawyers moving from

government to private practice and offering guidelines to assist practitioners in avoiding related
conflicts).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g); see, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F.

Supp. 1176, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (relying on cases "requir[ing] corporations involved in
derivative suits to retain counsel with no prior ties to the individual defendants or the
corporation"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g) cmt. 13-14.
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 7.
12. See, e.g., Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 514-15 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Fin.
Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See generally United States
v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (convicting defendant-attorney of mail fraud based, in
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Normative standards should be established to guide counsel's conduct.
II.
A.

TAKEOVER BIDS

GeneralRule

Courts and commentators generally agree that, in the absence of a
disabling conflict of interest (which includes, in this context, the
perpetration of illegal conduct' 3), the incumbent board of directors may be
looked to as representing the corporate entity.14 Hence, in arm's length
corporate acquisitions, it is often presumed that because the board's
function is to act in the best interests of the corporation, there is no conflict
between management and the shareholders. 15 For example, in the hostile
takeover setting, an accepted practice is for the board to evaluate the bid

part, on his breach of his duty of loyalty to his firm's client); Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Dart Group
Corp., 621 F. Supp. 725 (D. Del. 1985) (sustaining disqualification of law firm for prior
representation of adverse client by drafting a memorandum discussing corporation's potential
regulatory problems); In re Conduct of Kinsey, 660 P.2d 660 (Or. 1983) (holding that accepting
employment from majority shareholders to create a new competing corporation and advising
majority shareholders on how to defeat old corporation while serving as old corporation's
corporate counsel warranted public reprimand); Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983)
(considering the duty of corporate counsel to individual shareholders of the corporation).
13. See generally Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (involving a
shareholder derivative suit alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and other various federal and state violations); Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins.
Co. of Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979) (involving a lawyer's active assistance in
accomplishing the improper sale of an insurance company by the company's inside directors); In
re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981)
(involving alleged aiding and abetting of a fraudulent scheme by corporate attorney); MARC I.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 896-903 (4th ed. 2004) (citing the Supreme Court's
discussion of the misappropriation theory in United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997));
Victor H. Kramer, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in Professional
Responsibility, 67 GEO. L.J. 991 (1979) (discussing the history of ABA rules requiring disclosure
of client fraud); Irma S. Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon: Observations on Issues of
Legal Ethics for Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 513 (2003)
(discussing a lawyer's role with respect to both society and his or her corporate clients).
14. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995); Paramount
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmts. 1, 5; see also George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest and
Effective Representation: The Dilemma of CorporateCounsel, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 608 (1988).
15. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101,
105 (1979); William H. Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 882, 884-85 (1978); Justice Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of
CorporateLaw, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 336-37 (2002).
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16
with the guidance of the corporation's counsel and investment bankers.
Because the board is normally deemed disinterested in this context
(particularly if reliance is placed on outside directors), no conflict of interest
exists. 17 As a result, when the challenge to incumbent management is
mounted from outside the management group, current law suggests that
separate counsel normally need not be
retained to represent the interests of
18
the various corporate constituencies.

B.

Alternative Proposalsfor Reform
The general practice described above may be subject to criticism. In
16.

See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST § 131

cmt. h (2000).
When the [takeover] challenge to incumbent management comes from outside the
management group, the role of the lawyer representing the organization must be to
follow policies adopted by the organization, in accordance with the organization's
decisionmaking procedures. Persons authorized to act on behalf of the organization
determine the organization's interest in responding to the challenge.
Id; see also supra notes 14-15.
17. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927-28 (Del. 2003);
MM Companies, Inc.. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126-27 (Del. 2003); Unitrin, 651
A.2d at 1372-73; ParamountCommc'ns, 571 A.2d at 1150; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); see also, MARC I. STEINBERG,
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 357-58 (3d ed. 2001) ("[A]t least under Delaware law, by
retaining outside advisers (such as investment bankers and lawyers) and relying extensively on
outside directors, the board, in all probability, will be able to rebut assertions that the defensive
maneuvers implemented were primarily motivated by entrenchment purposes, i.e., a desire to
retain control."); cf Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate,
46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 419 (2003) (offering evidence that throughout the late 1990's, companies'
takeover defenses significantly impacted the outcome of hostile bids); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in CorporateLaw?, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1775, 1780 (2002) (stating "[m]anagers interested in preserving their jobs and private
benefits of control will tend to favor restrictive takeover rules, whatever the costs to
shareholders").
18. See supra note 12; cf Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563
F.2d 671, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1977) (failing to find a conflict of interest); United States v. Sungard
Data Sys., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2001) (same). But see FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636
F.2d 1336, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The appellate court precluded counsel for Exxon from
representing certain divisions of Reliance Electric Company. Id. The court reasoned:
Central to the existence of this conflict is the fact that while Exxon and the [subject
Reliance divisions] now share a corporate identity, that identity might be shattered as a
result of the challenge mounted by the FTC to the acquisition of Reliance by Exxon.
Should divestiture be ordered by the FTC, Exxon and the [subject Reliance divisions]
will become competitors. This possibility, which would result directly from the
proceeding at which Exxon seeks joint representation, gives rise to a fundamental
conflict between Exxon and the [subject Reliance divisions].
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many takeovers the bulk of the shareholders, looking to the substantial
premium normally paid by the acquirer, favor the successful consummation
of the offer. The board of directors, on the other hand, may adopt defensive
tactics with the principal objective of retaining control. 19 Moreover, if the
interests of other constituencies are to be considered, as permitted by
several state statutes, 0 those interests may diverge from the interests of the
general shareholder populace. For example, corporate employees and
communities with corporate operations in their locale justifiably may fear
that approval of the acquisition by the subject corporation may result in
unemployment and the loss of a major benefactor to community wellbeing.2 1
1.

"Counselfor the Constituencies"

Accordingly, an argument can be made that, in light of these
conflicting views, separate counsel ("counsel for the constituencies") with
no prior affiliation with the corporation or its fiduciaries should be retained
to represent the various corporate constituencies. Counsel's principal role in
this context would be to ensure that the views of the major constituencies
from both a legal and policy perspective are brought to the board's
attention. Although management may reject the positions asserted, the
presence of separately retained independent counsel should help ensure that
the various countervailing arguments will be communicated and explained
to the board.
There are, however, at least two significant problems with such an
approach. First, because the different corporate constituencies likely will

19. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalismand CorporateLaw: The Race to
Protect Managersfrom Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1176 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Control:A CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
CorporateGovernance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & David R.
Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1981); Mary Siegel, Commentary, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A
Proposalfor Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 377-78 (1985); Marc I. Steinberg, Tender Offer
Regulation: The Needfor Reform, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1988).
20. See Comm.on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion,
45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2261 (1990).
21.
See Thomas F. O'Boyle & Susan Carey, Gulfs Departing Pittsburgh Would Deal a
Harsh Blow to City's Economy and Pride, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1984, at 33 ("Standard Oil Co. of
California's $13.3 billion bid to acquire the oil giant has brought shudders to Pittsburgh charities,
university presidents, tax officials, ministers and everyone else who benefits from Gulfs financial
and civic might."); see also Kaplan, ProfessionalResponsibility Issues in Takeovers, 21 Rev. Sec.
& Comm. Reg. 49 (1988); Roberta S.Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the
Corporationa Paradigmfor Directors?,39 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 695 (1988).
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take diverse positions in response to the takeover bid,22 there may be present
a disabling conflict, precluding multiple representation. 23 Second, the
decision on whether to accept or oppose the prospective acquirer's offer
remains within the discretion of the subject corporation's board of
directors-the very body whose alleged inability to consider impartially the
various interests prompted the appointment of "counsel for the
constituencies." Consequently, the role of appointed counsel may well be
superfluous, providing no tangible benefits.
Nonetheless, supporters of this proposal may argue that counsel for the
constituencies need not advocate one constituency's position at the expense
of others. Rather, counsel may serve solely as the "communicator" of the
diverse views held by the constituencies to ensure that the board is
cognizant of the various positions. Alternatively, it may be contended
(although probably not convincingly, because the interests of the
constituencies may be more antagonistic than mutual) that counsel's role
may be likened to that of an "intermediary" under Rule 2.2 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.24 By engaging in this multiple
representation as an intermediary, counsel would utilize his or her
persuasive skills in an effort to convince management why certain actions
should or should not be taken. Such dialogue might shed new light for the
board in determining what response should be made to the takeover bid.26

22. See supra notes 17, 19 and accompanying text. It may be argued that counsel may act as
solely the communicator of the diverse views held by the various constituencies. Counsel need not
advocate one particular constituency's position over another. See infra notes 32-33 and
accompanying text.
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2004); supra notes 3-11.
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (1984). While the 2002 amendments to
the Model Rules deleted Rule 2.2, a number of states continue to retain this provision (the lawyer
as intermediary) in their ethical rules.
25. See id. 2.2 cmt.
26. Id. The comment to Rule 2.2 provides:
A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship
between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in
helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working
out financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an
interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or mediating a
dispute between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by
developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party may have
to obtain separate representation, with the possibility in some situations of incurring
additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors,
all the clients may prefer that the lawyer act as intermediary.
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The "Consultative" Attorney

Even assuming that appointment of "counsel for the constituencies" is
ill-advised from both a legal and practical standpoint, alternative approaches
remain. One such approach is the appointment of the "consultative" attorney
(or law firm) to render a "second opinion. 2 7 During the past decade, from a
general perspective, the consultative attorney mechanism to render a second
opinion has been employed to a greater extent 28 but nonetheless is currently
utilized on a relatively infrequent basis. 29 Under this approach, the
consultative attorney, having no prior affiliation with the corporation or its
fiduciaries, would be retained to evaluate the relevant circumstances and to
render a second opinion regarding management's contemplated course of
action.
Such a second opinion may be appropriate because, in most cases, the
corporation's outside general counsel has been retained for a prolonged
period of time. 30 Perhaps as a result of the substantial legal fees earned and
the long-term association with incumbent management, such counsel may
find it troublesome to advise the corporate client with the requisite
independence. Accordingly, the consultative attorney may play the
meaningful function of providing legal advice and insights from a more
27. See Stanley Sporkin & Marc I. Steinberg, Second Opinion for Lawyers-The
"Consultative Lawyer", N.Y. L.J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 1; see also Michael Klausner, Geoffrey Miller
& Richard Painter, Second Opinions in Litigation, 84 VA. L. REv. 1411, 1412 (1998).
While legal advice is often extraordinarily useful, it is subject to problems, including
the possibility that the attorney may erroneously evaluate the nature or strength of a
case and the danger that the attorney's self-interest may impair the quality of his advice.
At first glance, it appears that one way in which a client can respond to these problems
is to obtain a second opinion from another lawyer.
Id.
28. See, e.g., Miriam P. Hechler, The Role of the CorporateAttorney Within the Takeover
Context: Loyalties to Whom?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 943, 972-73 (1996); see also Lawrence B.
Pedowitz, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26, 1983, at 15 ("[W]hile I wholeheartedly endorse
the suggestion that lawyers should regularly consult in order to improve the quality of their
judgments, I believe it is incorrect to suggest that the 'second opinion' practice is not already
extant in our profession."). See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(b), 205.3(b)(6)(ii) (2004) (providing
standards of professional conduct for attorneys representing an issuer and appearing and practicing
before the SEC and providing in certain contexts that the procurement of a second opinion from
independent counsel is deemed an appropriate response pursuant to the SEC's standards of
professional conduct for attorneys).
29. See Hechler, supra note 28, at 969-74; John S. Martin, Jr., A Second Opinion, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 10, 1983, at 12 ("We agree with Mr. [former Judge] Sporkin and Mr. Steinberg that the
concept [of a 'second opinion'] is a good one, and that attorneys should be open to its use in the
future. It is a provocative and workable area within the legal profession."); Sporkin & Steinberg,
supra note 27, at 1.
30. See Hechler, supra note 28, at 971.
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neutral perspective.
There are important differences between the roles of counsel for the
constituencies and the consultative attorney. First, unlike counsel for the
constituencies, the consultative attorney represents the entity as a whole
rather than the various constituencies. Accordingly, the multiple
representation conflict-of-interest dilemma does not surface, at least not so
explicitly, in this setting. Hence, like the outside general counsel, the
consultative attorney initially may look to the incumbent board of directors
as the proper representative of corporate interests.32 Second, the advice
rendered by the consultative attorney may have a greater impact upon board
conduct. Unlike counsel for the constituencies, the consultative attorney
does not legally analyze the situation at issue from the perspectives of
certain diverse interest groups, but rather from that of the corporation in its
entirety. As a result, management may be in a more difficult position to
reject advice with which it disagrees. Moreover, faced with the prospect that
the consultative attorney is retained to proffer its opinion, the corporation's
general outside
counsel may be even more circumspect in formulating his or
33
her advice.
31. See id. (stating that "it is doubtful that an attorney would give up lucrative fees by
counseling a corporation's board [of directors] to 'cave in' to a hostile offer"); see also Sporkin &
Steinberg, supranote 27, at 3.
There are few events as important to a corporation's welfare as when a tender offer is
made to its shareholders by another corporation, that is, an unfriendly takeover attempt.
Normally, in these instances the client will retain specialized counsel in defending such
takeover attempts. There are a number of decisions that arise during the course of a
hostile battle for control that present disparate choices to the various interests
comprising the corporate framework. Such points of decision are susceptible to having
independent counsel render a second opinion to help ensure that the disparate interests
are being duly represented.
Id. The same "consultative" role may be played by an investment banker. See infra notes 84-90
and accompanying text.
32. To ensure that the presence of consultative counsel has significant input rather that being
merely superficial, such counsel, although initially looking to the incumbent board of directors as
the proper representative of corporate interests, must maintain the requisite independence. See
generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.7 (2004) (providing the requisite

independence necessary to avoid a conflict of interest).
33. This statement should not be construed as implying that retained counsel is necessarily
biased. In this regard, however, the following assertion may be made:
Undoubtedly, it may be argued that, where a law firm composed of a fairly large
number of attorneys serves as counsel, such second opinions are unnecessary. This is
based on the premise that an attorney working within his or her law firm often consults
with other attorneys in the firm before recommending action. Although this may well be
true, the principal value of a second opinion is its independence. Although lawyers in
the same firm are often free to express their independent judgments, nevertheless they
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Hence, the consultative attorney concept may have a beneficial impact
on corporate accountability. Nonetheless, in either of the foregoing
alternatives (i.e., counsel for the constituencies or the consultative attorney),
the incumbent board determines the corporation's response to the takeover
bid. Even if some members of the board do not have a material financial
interest as evidenced by their lack of substantial stock ownership, the inside
directors34 normally have significant stockholdings as well as an interest in
maintaining their positions of power within the corporate structure. 35 Any
legitimate takeover bid, particularly one that is successful, also may signify
to the financial world that the insiders are inadequate managers, an image
that any reputable corporate executive loathes.36 To a certain extent, some
courts recognize this claim of bias. When a majority of the board is
comprised of outside directors 37 who oppose the takeover bid, these courts
are more receptive to invoke the broad protection of the business judgment
rule.38
3.

"Counselfor the Committee"
Taking the above approaches a step (or perhaps several steps) further,

cannot be truly as objective as a third party examining the situation. Further, as
important as the fact of independence may well be the appearance of independence.
Sporkin & Steinberg, supra note 27, at 3; see also Hechler, supra note 28, at 971 & n.164.
34. "Inside" directors include those who also hold positions as executive officers of the
corporation, or who are otherwise employed by the company, for example, as in-house corporate
counsel.
35. See, e.g., Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980)
(applying New Jersey law); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying
Delaware law); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (citing
Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962)).
36. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300-01, (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying Delaware law).
37. "Outside" (or "independent") directors should be defined as those directors who do not
have a material relationship with the corporation or its inside directors or executive officers. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 81 SEC Docket 1586, 158689 (Nov. 4, 2003) (approving new corporate governance standards, including that the majority of
directors of a subject board of directors be independent, for corporations listed on the New York
Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ Stock Market); Joris M. Hogan, CorporateGovernance Update:
Changes in the BoardroomAfter Enron, 32 SEC. REG. L.J. 4, 12-14 (2004).
38. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374-75 (Del. 1995);
Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989); Unocal, 493 A.2d at
954. See generally R. Franklin Balotti & Joseph Hinsey, IV, Director Care, Conduct, and
Liability: The Model Business CorporationAct Solution, 56 Bus. LAW. 35 (2000) (discussing
1998 Model Business Corporation Act amendments addressing standards for director conduct and
liability). Outside directors also are subject to claims of bias. See infra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
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an argument can be made that a corporation's response to a takeover bid
should be formulated by a committee comprised solely of outside directors.
To help ensure detachment from the inside directors, the general inside or
outside counsel should play no significant role. Rather, separate counsel
with no prior affiliation with the corporation or its fiduciaries should be
retained for the purpose of advising the committee ("counsel for the
committee"). Any communication that needs to be made by the general
counsel should be made directly to the counsel for the committee and not to
the outside directors. Given the outside directors' relative lack of pecuniary
interest and the threat of monetary liability for breach of their fiduciary
duties, 39 it may be asserted that this proposal provides a viable alternative:
the response to the takeover bid is delegated to the most disinterested
members of the board who, with the advice proffered by counsel for the
committee, will seek to represent the corporation's best interests.
This alternative, however, is not without its problems. Irrespective of
40
whether one is an inside or outside director, the problem of structural bias
39. Delaware, as well as several other states, have enacted statutes that permit directors to be
absolved from monetary liability for breach of the duty of care, provided that an appropriate
provision to that effect is contained in the subject corporation's articles of incorporation. See, e.g.,
S. 533, 133d Del. Gen. Assembly § 2 (1986) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)); see
also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); Arnold v. Soc'y for Savs. Bancorp,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1287-88 (Del. 1994); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 783 (Del. 1993);
RODMAN WARD, JR., EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 102.15 (4th ed. Supp. 2005); E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A.
Finkelstein & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of
Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 401-02 (1987). Moreover,
some of these state statutes are more lax than the Delaware version. See, e.g., Orin v. Huntington
Bancshares, Inc., 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1719 (Ohio 1986) ("Under the new [Ohio] law,
the business judgment rule protects directors from monetary liability [including actions brought
for injunctive relief] except where clear and convincing evidence demonstrates a deliberate intent
to injure the company or a reckless disregard for its welfare."); Goolsby & Whitson, Virginia's
New CorporateCode, 19 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 147 (1986); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.30 (2002) (listing states that have laws which allow a corporation to reduce or eliminate a
director's personal liability to a corporation or its shareholders in specified circumstances).
40. "Structural bias" may be defined as "inherent prejudice ... resulting from the
composition and character of the board of directors [and management]." Note, The Business
Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors,65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 601 n.14 (1980);
see also id at 619-26; cf Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53-54 (5th Cir.
1980) (recognizing the possibility of structural bias, the court held that, due to conflicts of interest,
the board was incompetent to compromise the plaintiff shareholders' derivative claims); In re PSE
& G S'holder Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 320 (N.J. 2002) (stating that "[d]irectors understandably are
not likely to be enthusiastic about approving the prosecution of a shareholder's suit against
members of management with whom the directors maintain an ongoing relationship"); Miller v.
Register & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983) (recognizing structural bias
problem in refusing to dismiss derivative suit against corporate fiduciaries where members
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remains. Outside directors may owe their retention on the board to the
insiders. During their tenure, outside directors are likely to develop
friendships with their colleagues, affecting their impartiality. Moreover, a
number of the outside directors may come from the same background as the
insiders (e.g., they may themselves be insiders of other corporations) and
may have known the insiders long before they were requested to serve as
directors. There is also a certain prestige of serving as a director of a
reputable publicly-held company. A takeover bid may be viewed by outside
directors as an insult to their business acumen, which should be swiftly
rebuked.41 Hence, far from being assumed to be independent, outside
directors are potentially biased.42
4. The PreferableApproach-The "Consultative" Attorney
Under the framework adopted by several courts, a board of directors
under the business judgment rule may fend off a takeover bid in order to
maintain the enterprise as an ongoing, viable entity.4 3 With that principle in
comprising the special litigation committee were appointed to the committee by defendant
fiduciaries).
The inherent problem of structural bias is discussed at length in Note, The Propriety of
Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1894, 1901 (1983).
Drawing upon studies of group dynamics, the author of the Note concluded: "Given cohesiveness
and informational dependence in the boardroom, directors are likely to conform to the
expectations both of management and of their fellow board members." Id.
41. Hence, although not financially interested, such outside directors may be "interested" in
maintaining:
[P]ositions of power, prestige and prominence ....
They are "interested" in defending
against outside attack the management which they have, in fact, installed or maintained
in power ....And they are "interested" in maintaining the public reputation of their
own leadership and stewardship against the claims of "raiders" who say that they can do
better.
Panter,646 F.2d at 300-01.
42. See In re PSE & G S'holder Litig., 801 A.2d at 320 ([T]he Court is well aware of the
questions now being raised in the broader marketplace about the objectivity and responsibility of
corporate directors."); Steinberg, supra note 19, at 6-7 ("Incumbent management's control of the
proxy machinery and general informational processes ... frequently results in undue directorial
loyalty to management rather than the exercise of independent judgment.") (footnotes omitted);
see also Note, Judicial Deference, supra note 40, at 1898 ("Confronted by difficult issues of
business policy and largely dependent upon management for information about these issues,
[outside] directors are likely to believe that management's views and judgments are worth
adopting.") (footnote omitted).
Note, that as a condition of a corporation having its securities traded on the New York
Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ Stock Market, a majority of its directors must be deemed
independent. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 81 SEC
Docket 1586, 1586-89 (Nov. 4, 2003).
43. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003); MM
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focus, attention should turn to providing the means by which the board can
more effectively represent the corporation's best interests. In the context of
legal advice, the appointment of the "consultative" attorney to provide a
"second opinion," although far from perfect, should be viewed as a
preferable route.44
It should be recognized, however, that the consultative attorney (or
consultative law firm) may itself have an inherent bias. "A number of major
law firms today have the reputation of counseling subject corporations to
ward off hostile bidders. 4 5 With each successful defense, the law firm's
reputation is enhanced in the eyes of potential target management. Hence, it
is to such a law firm's financial benefit to devise successful legal strategies
for implementation by subject corporations.4 6 Retention of such a law firm
as separate counsel may be appropriate after an informed board acting in
good faith determines to oppose a takeover bid, but it may be questioned
whether retaining the firm prior to a bidder indicating interest serves the
corporation's and shareholders' best interests. Given the realities of
corporate practice, however, these firms will certainly continue to be
separately retained prior to any acquirer overtures. On balance, this
approach can be justified. The development of anti-takeover strategies with
expert counsel's input is a valid planning arrangement. With such defensive
measures in place, the board is more likely to defeat inadequate bids, rather
than having to fend them off with insufficient ammunition. Moreover, the
adoption of these measures, at least in theory, does not prevent the board
Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003); Paramount Commc'ns,
571 A.2d at 1152; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985); Unocal,

493 A.2d at 955. Note, however, that the business judgment rule does not apply where the
company is to be broken up and not maintained as a separate ongoing entity. See, e.g., Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York

law); Revlon, Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986).
Moreover, even where the defensive maneuvers are undertaken to maintain the company's
independence, a number of courts apply a modified version of the business judgment rule, e.g.,
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55, or decline to apply the rule where a purpose underlying
management's tactics is to retain control, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
269 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying New York law). See also MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES
REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 11.08 (2005).

44.
45.

See supra Part II.B.2.
Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Acquisitions, 39

HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592 (1988).
46. See Hechler, supra note 28, at 973-75; Editorial, Life Tenurefor Managers?, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 23, 1987, at 32, Col. 1 (In reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana anti-takeover
statute, the Journal opined: "Lawyer Marty Lipton, king of the entrenched-manager bar, is doing
cartwheels.").
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from making a dispassionate assessment of the bid's merits. In this regard,
however, separately retained counsel's role in devising and counseling the
board's adoption of anti-takeover strategies should preclude it from being
retained as consultative counsel.
Due to the presence of structural bias and the appearance of
impropriety, a lawyer or firm qualified to serve as consultative attorney to
render an impartial second opinion should have no prior association with the
corporation or its fiduciaries and should be knowledgeable in the field of
mergers and acquisitions.47 Attorneys affiliated with such a law firm
generally will be highly qualified to advise in this consultative role.
Nonetheless, such counsel, if retained by incumbent management, may give
the appearance that they favor the incumbent board. To lessen that effect as
much as practicable, the selection of the consultative attorney (or law firm)
should be within the outside directors' purview. In this way, the corporation
and its various constituencies benefit from procuring expert advice from
counsel who has no prior affiliation with the corporation or its fiduciaries,
thereby increasing the likelihood that the second opinion will be truly
independent.48
III. PARENT SQUEEZE-OUTS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
The foregoing discussion presumed that the subject corporation's
board of directors or a controlling shareholder did not have a material
financial interest in the proposed transaction. Such a financial stake
increases the potential for conflict. This section will consider two types of
transactions where this problem exists: namely, first, squeeze-out mergers,
in which the parent corporation eliminates the public shareholders of its
subsidiary (or alternatively when a controlling shareholder of a corporation
uses his or her power to take the enterprise private), and second, leveraged

47. It may be asserted that the consultative attorney should be required to have recently
represented on a fairly equal basis both offeror and subject corporations in contested takeover bids.
The frequency of representation between offerors and targets need not be precisely equal. Such
representation, however, must be rendered during contested bids in order to be relevant in this
context. By representing both bidders and targets in contested bids, counsel will be less likely to
have a bias, albeit unconsciously, in favor of one side over the other. On the other hand, such a
requirement may be too rigid. Regardless of whether counsel principally has represented targets or
bidders in hostile battles, it may be argued that the requisite expertise and independence to render
a second opinion is present.
48. See Sporkin & Steinberg, supra note 27, at 3; Comm. on Corporate Laws, Guidelinesfor

the UnaffiliatedDirector of the Controlled Corporation,44 BUs. LAW. 211, 219 (1988); see also
Marc I. Steinberg & Evalyn N. Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 406 (1984).
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buyouts, in which corporate management procures a substantial equity
interest in the enterprise.
A.

ControllingShareholderSqueeze-Outs

With respect to squeeze-out mergers, it is clear that the parent
corporation, as controlling shareholder, owes a fiduciary duty to the
subsidiary's public shareholders. 49 As interpreted by the Delaware Supreme
Court, the parent corporation in long-form mergers must accord the
minority entire fairness comprised of fair dealing and fair price. 50 Disregard
of those obligations may give rise to a shareholders' action premised on
breach of fiduciary duty. 5 1 Although a number of other states have relegated
a minority shareholder to solely his or her appraisal rights based on claims
of unfair treatment, 52 that consequence does not alleviate counsel's conflictof-interest dilemma. Counsel who represents both the parent and the
subsidiary corporation in a squeeze-out situation will find it difficult to
adequately represent the interests of minority shareholders.5 3 Even where
the subsidiary has retained separate counsel, that counsel is faced with the
dilemma that what is beneficial to the subsidiary's controlling shareholder
(i.e., the parent corporation) may unfortunately be detrimental to the
minority.54
From the perspective of corporate accountability, minority
shareholders comprise an essential component of a parent-controlled

49. See, e.g., Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 25 (N.Y. 1984); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952); Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, A Restatement of CorporateFreezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1354 (1978).
50. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-13 (Del. 1983); see also Marc I. Steinberg,
Short-Form Mergers in Delaware, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 489, 489-91 (2002). But see Glassman v.

Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) ("[A]bsent fraud or illegality, appraisal
is the exclusive remedy available to a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form merger.").
51. Weinberger,457 A.2d at 712, 714.
52. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.601 (West 2004); Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729
P.2d 683, 690 (Cal. 1986); Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 422 A.2d 311, 318 (Conn. 1979).
53. See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429-30 (Del. 1997).
54. See, e.g., Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984). Note, moreover,
that SEC Rule 13e-3 applies to going-private transactions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2004). With
respect to Rule 13e-3, see Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates,
Exchange Act Release No. 16,075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (Aug. 8, 1979). In general, Rule 13e-3
prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative acts or practices in connection with going
private transactions and prescribe[s] new filing, disclosure and dissemination requirements as a
means reasonably designed to prevent such acts or practices." Id. at 46,736. See generally Ndiva
Kofele-Kale, The SEC's Going-PrivateRules-Analysis and Developments, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 139

(1991) (discussing section 13(e)'s private disclosure rules for going private transactions).
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subsidiary. 5 Additionally, the parent, over a period of time, has elected to
reap the benefits of a public equity market for its subsidiary's stock rather
than taking the enterprise private. 6 Consequently, the interests of the
minority should be viewed as an integral aspect in ascertaining the limits of
permissible corporate conduct. Because the interests of the parent
corporation as controlling shareholder of the subsidiary often conflict with
the best interests of the minority, a disabling conflict of interest should be
presumed, thereby precluding the attorney from representing all affected
parties.57
Accordingly, the outside directors of the subsidiary should be
designated as a duly authorized committee charged with the task of
bargaining with the parent corporation to help ensure fair treatment for the
minority.5 8 To effectuate that objective, the committee should retain an
investment banker and counsel with no prior affiliation with either
corporation or its inside directors.5 9 Although the problem of structural bias

55.

See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Rules of Shareholders and

Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1969) (analyzing
decision-making power in corporations); Robert L. Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving

Target, 79 MICH. L. REV. 478 (1981) (discussing corporate governance); Lewis D. Solomon,
Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals for

Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975) (examining corporations going private).
56. See Viener v. Jacobs, 834 A.2d 546, 558 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Brudney & Chirelstein,
supra note 49, at 1358; Bate C. Toms, III, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step
Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 548-49 (1978); Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers:
The Application of Federaland State Law to an Innovative CorporateAcquisition Technique, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 389, 390 (1982); see also, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2004) (the SEC going-private
rule).
57.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS:

CONFLICTS OF

INTEREST § 131 cmt. h (2000).

When all or part of incumbent management seeks to obtain control of the
organization, typically by restructuring ownership of and authority in the organization, a
conflict of interest is presented between the individual interests of those members of
management and the holders of ownership and authority. Because of their personal
interests, those members of management ordinarily would not be appropriate agents to
direct the work of a lawyer for the organization with respect to the takeover attempt.
Whether a lawyer's personal interests, for example, those based on longtime association
with incumbent management, preclude the lawyer from representing the organization or
the managers seeking control depends on whether the lawyer's personal interests create
a substantial risk of material and adverse effect on the representation.
Id.
58. See Tremont, 694 A.2d at 428; Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110,
1117 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983). In the setting of a
parent-subsidiary merger, bargaining principally will involve matters of fair value, namely price,
although fair dealing also plays an integral role. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709-10 n.7, 711-14.
59. To an increasing extent, this proposal is being advocated. See Tremont, 694 A.2d at 429;
In re Digex, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1207 (Del. Ch. 2000); 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
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among directors is not resolved by this proposal,6 ° the impact of any such
bias is likely to be alleviated by the retention of outside experts who
hopefully will have the requisite independence. 6' Although imperfect, the
proposal provides a practical and more enlightened solution.
The standards set forth above arguably should apply equally when a
controlling individual shareholder, by means of a forced transaction, such as
a merger with an entity wholly owned by that shareholder and created for
the single purpose of effectuating the transaction,62 takes the corporation
private, thereby eliminating the minority. 63 In such situations, for the
reasons stated above, 64 the outside directors of the corporation should be
designated as a duly authorized committee to represent the interests of the
minority. The committee should retain an investment banker and counsel
who have no prior affiliation with the corporation or its inside directors.65
This scenario, however, manifests the potential of structural bias of the

(BNA) 175 (Jan. 30, 1987) (statement of Arthur Fleischer, Jr.); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward
B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel,
59 BUS. LAW. 1389, 1391-92 (2004); Roger Lowenstein, GAF Chairman Gets Approvalfor BuyOut, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at A4; Gary Putka & Ralph E. Winter, BP Increases Bid for
Standard Oil by $450 Million, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1987, at 2 ("The new bid [by British
Petroleum Co., which owns fifty-five percent of Standard Oil Co.] won the acceptance of seven
outside Standard Oil directors who had sought better terms."). Note, however, that the investment
banker and counsel selected by the outside directors often may have a prior affiliation with either
of the corporations or subject fiduciaries, hence giving rise to the structural bias issue.
60. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
61. See Hazard & Rock, supra note 59, at 1391-92; Kaplan, supra note 21, at 52; Ronald D.
Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing Members of Corporate Families, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 655, 678 (1997); Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 48, at 406.
Under the present framework.., few independent parties would thoroughly
evaluate a company without a reasonable chance of successful purchase, except for the
investment banker selected by management to render a fairness opinion. Generally, the
minority interest cannot afford to hire its own investment banker. Therefore, to help
effectuate the intent of the independent evaluation alternative, the outside directors of
the subsidiary corporation should retain an investment banker who has no previous
contacts with the parent or subsidiary corporation or with either corporation's
management. Through the use of the fairness opinion relied on by minority
shareholders, an independent investment banker who is free of the usual structural
biases will help insure that the going private transaction is fair to the minority.
Id. (footnote omitted).
62. For explanatory material on triangular mergers and other corporate combinations, see
STEINBERG, supra note 43, § 4.01[3].
63. See supra note 54.
64. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
65. See Comm. on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of the
Controlled Corporation,45 BUs. LAW. 429, 437 (1989); 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 175 (Jan.
30, 1987); sources cited supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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outside directors in an individually dominated corporation (presuming there
are outside directors on the board). As a result, the added procedural
mechanisms, such as the appointment of separate counsel, may provide little
substantive protection for the minority. Thus, the minority may be provided
with more meaningful relief by a flexible interpretation of fiduciary duty
obligations and of valuation in the appraisal proceeding.66 In any event, and
particularly if separate counsel is not retained, the corporation's general
counsel should remain cognizant of the possible conflicting interests and
should advise the board of directors to adhere to the fiduciary duties owed
to the minority. 67 Indeed, because the controlling shareholder(s) will
financially benefit from the transaction, counsel should look solely to the
disinterested members of the board to represent the enterprise.6 8
B.

Leveraged Buyouts

Leveraged buyouts in which public shareholders are cashed-out and
corporate insiders obtain a substantial equity interest in the ongoing
69
enterprise have long raised troublesome questions of conflicts of interest.
In this situation, the insiders' interests in procuring a bargain price are
adverse to the public shareholders' objective of maximizing their returns.
Moreover, the concept of insiders enhancing their pecuniary interests
through the use of borrowed funds collateralized with corporate assets and
subject to repayment out of corporate revenues strikes some authorities as
repugnant to public shareholder welfare. 7 °
66. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918-19, 921-22 (Del. 2000); Orman v. Cullman,
794 A.2d 5, 40-41 (Del. Ch. 2002); Jahn v. Kinderman, 814 N.E.2d 116, 124-25 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004); Missala Marine Servs., Inc. v. Odom, 861 So. 2d 290, 295 (Miss. 2003); Ault v. Soutter,
570 N.Y.S.2d 280, 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Viener v. Jacobs, 834 A.2d 546, 556 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003).
67. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2004) ("The lawyer's own
interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.").
68. In short, this is likely an interested director's transaction in which the participating
director is disabled from exerting undue influence upon the corporation's response to the
transaction. See Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory Responses to InterestedDirectors'
Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201, 227
(1977); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Approval by DisinterestedDirectors, 20 J. CORP. L. 215, 216
(1995); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and CorporateMorality, 22
BUS. LAW. 35, 42 (1966).
69. Thirty years ago, then SEC Commissioner Sommer opined: "The shareholder must no
longer be a second class citizen. Once he is invited to feast and he pays his admission, those who
own the tent must not be able to usher him out at the end of the second course with only the menu
as his souvenir." "Going Private":A Lesson in CorporateResponsibility, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,010 (1974).
70. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 49, at 1359; Deborah A. DeMott, Directors'
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It thus should not be surprising that both the insiders and public
shareholders should have separate counsel to represent their opposing
interests. 7 1 Because the insiders have a material financial stake in the
transaction, they no longer can be looked to as representing the corporate
entity.72 Hence, the role of the corporation's general counsel in this context
may well be to help ensure that adequate disclosure is made (to the board of
directors and shareholders) and to advise the directors of their fiduciary
duties.73 Moreover, the disinterested directors should comprise a special
committee and retain an outside law firm and an investment banker, both of
whom have no prior affiliation with the corporation or the insiders.7 4 Such
precautions increase the likelihood that the determination to authorize the
buyout and the valuation reached will maximize shareholder value 75 and be
reasonably informed.76
IV. SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT OF PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS

This article has suggested that, in the takeover bid context, special
counsel, such as the "consultative" attorney, be retained by the outside
directors to advise the board of directors and that, in certain other
acquisition situations, a committee comprised of disinterested directors be
advised by separate independent counsel. After receiving the advice of
separately retained counsel and investment bankers, the board and pertinent

Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 539
(1988); Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc 1. Steinberg, A Reappraisalof Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5 and the New
Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 272 n.49 (1980); John K. Galbraith, The 1929 Parallel,ATL.
MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 62; Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730,
777 (1985); Daniel J. Morrissey, Law, Ethics, and the Leveraged Buyout, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 403,
406 (1988); David M. Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in
CorporateDoctrine,32 RUTGERS L. REV. 184, 223-25 (1979).
71. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
72. See authorities cited supra notes 59, 68-70.
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST § 131 cmt. h (2000).
74. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877-78 (Del. 1985); Hazard & Rock, supra note 59,
at 1391.
76. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.4, and note 75 and accompanying text. The outside general
counsel should be wary of representing both management and the issuer in this context. Such dual
representation may result in waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See ARTHUR M. BORDEN &
JOEL A. YUNIS, GOING PRIVATE § 9.01 (2002). Indeed, normally counsel should represent solely
the entity. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST § 131 cmt. h.
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committee(s) may better represent the germane interests at stake. This
scenario raises the question whether procedural mechanisms provide any
meaningful substantive protection to corporate and minority shareholder
interests.7 7
The problem of directors' structural bias has been discussed above and
elaborated upon by courts and commentators. 8 Moreover, the alleged bias
of investment bankers in rendering fairness and other valuation opinions has
been raised, but certainly not resolved. 79 Attorney conflict-of-interest
dilemmas also come into play in the corporate acquisition context. A law
firm that annually derives hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars
in fees from a corporate client has a financial self-interest in counseling to
maintain that entity as an ongoing, independent concern with the incumbent
management intact. 80 Successful consummation of a third-party takeover
bid-whether by merger, tender offer, or otherwise-normally signifies that
the third party's law firm will be retained to represent the combined
enterprise. 8 1 Although a number of courts have refused to recognize this
potential for conflict, 82 such an approach ignores the realities of law firm
77. See Longstreth, Now Private Citizen, Calls for Reform in Leverage Buyouts, 16 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 641 (Apr. 13, 1984); Longstreth says Federal,State Laws are not Assuring
Fairness in Buyouts, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1908-09 (Oct. 14, 1983) (noting former SEC
Commissioner Longstreth's criticisms of certain procedural mechanisms, such as investment
bankers' fairness opinions, as providing no substantive benefit to public shareholders).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
79. See supra note 77 and the remarks of former SEC Commissioner Longstreth. This
alleged bias is further complicated because:
A problem in the application of this theory to fairness opinions lies in the lack of
concrete standards in the investment banking community. It appears that, in determining
value, the conduct of investment bankers, unlike accountants, is not governed by a set
of industry guidelines other than those general factors that the Weinberger court laid
out. Thus, the weight in a given case assigned to such factors as asset, market, dividend,
and earning values is left largely to the discretion of the individual investment banker.
Addressing the valuation techniques of two reputable investment bankers in one recent
case, the Delaware court referred to the "questionable methodology employed" as well
as the "quick and cursory" analysis used before concluding that "both the opinions of
Morgan Stanley and of Goldman Sachs leave something to be desired." Moreover, even
when investment bankers use the same data for arriving at their opinions, they often
express different opinions as to value.
Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 48, at 399 (footnotes omitted).
80. See Hechler, supra note 28, at 971. A key aspect here, regardless of whether a leveraged
buyout or hostile takeover bid is involved, is that incumbent management will continue to operate
the enterprise on an ongoing basis.
81. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 1100 (1982) ("The [target's] professional advisors, whether they are investment
bankers or lawyers, are likely to lose a client, and, especially in the case of a lawyer, the loss may
have serious consequences.").
82. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1979).
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economics. The loss of a major client often causes a financial setback for
members of a law firm, and the loss of a few such clients may spell
catastrophe.83
Consequently, purportedly protective mechanisms may offer relatively
little meaningful benefit to corporate and shareholder interests if boards of
directors and committees comprised of disinterested directors are advised by
counsel and investment bankers who have a material economic stake in
maintaining the status quo. The inherent structural bias of the outside
directors (and the more obvious pecuniary interests of the insiders),84 when
combined with the opinions rendered by their professional advisers (e.g.,
counsel and investment bankers), normally will effectuate the response
desired by incumbent management.8 5 Moreover, because such actions, taken
to maintain the corporation as an ongoing viable entity, 86 will be engineered
by directors who are likely to be deemed disinterested (or independent)
under the applicable case law,87 the business judgment rule will apply in

83. See Patricia B. Gray, Law Firms' Big Fee Hikes Reflect Higher Pay and Booming
Business, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1987, at 37 (stating "[s]everal law firms have collapsed in recent
months: Sage Gray Todd & Sims, one of the oldest on Wall Street, and Memel, Jacobs &
Ellsworth in Los Angeles"); Ann Grimes, Brobeck Law Firm Could Dissolve As Merger Folds,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at B2 (stating that "Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, one of the most
profitable and powerful law firms in the San Francisco Bay area, is likely to dissolve"); Julie
Mason, Houston Law Firm Probedfor Role in Fall of Enron, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 14, 2002, at
A13 (reporting that billings of Enron account constituted seven percent of subject law firm's
revenues); Brenda Sandburg, Brobeck to End Turmoil by Going Out ofBusiness, NAT'L. L.J., Feb.
3, 2003, at A15, Col. 1 ("Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, a legal institution here that just two years
ago stood at the pinnacle of the technology law firm boom, announced... that it will
dissolve .... ); Why Law Firms Fail:An In-Depth Look at Warning Signs, 04-9 Law Off. Mgmt.
& Admin. Rep. 2 (Sept. 2004) (stating that in 2003 there were eighty law firm failures).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
85. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927-28 (Del. 2003);
MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126-27 (Del. 2003); Unitrin, Inc. v.
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372-73 (Del. 1995); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
86. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55. Note, however, that the business judgment rule
may not apply to board decisions favoring a particular bidder when the enterprise is to be broken
up. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Michigan
law); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 283 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying
New York law); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del.
1986).
87. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1981)
(applying Delaware law); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (2d Cir.
1980) (applying New York law); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 626 (Del. 1984); In re Gaylord
Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 477-78 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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88
many jurisdictions to insulate such actions from successful challenge.
The presence of structural bias has not been eliminated under the
proper
framework. Nonetheless,
governance
corporate
present
bid
takeover
in
the
role
attorney's
implementation of the "consultative"
context and of the "counsel for the outside directors" in certain other
acquisition settings, such as in squeeze-out mergers, may enhance corporate
accountability with relatively minor costs. Although some directors may
tend to retain advisers who are predisposed to rendering advice presenting
justifiable grounds in favor of incumbent management,8 9 implementation of
the following practices should lessen the potential for bias. First, the
attorney and investment banker, separately retained, should be selected by
the outside directors. Second, those advisers should have no professional or
personal affiliations with any of the subject companies or their management.
Third, if the advisers have engaged in this type of representation (such as
serving as consultative attorney) on a fairly frequent basis, the advice
rendered (providing that the position recommended is known) should not
show a pattern of favoring management in nearly every instance. Fourth,
during the representation, the insiders should convey pertinent information
through counsel rather than directly communicating such information to the
outside directors. Fifth, after the representation terminates, the separately
retained counsel and investment banker should not be permitted to represent
any of the subject entities for a substantial period of time, for example, five
years. 90

88. Of course, certain requirements must be met before the business judgment rule may be
invoked, including that the decision is (a) a deliberative one, (b) that was reasonably informed, (c)
made by directors who acted in good faith without a disabling conflict of interest, and (d) with a
rational basis. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Marc I. Steinberg, The
American Law Institute's Draft Restatement on CorporateGovernance: The Business Judgment
Rule, Related Principles, and Some General Observations, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 295, 301-04
(1983). With respect to defensive measures undertaken by a subject board of directors in the
tender offer setting to maintain the corporation as an independent, viable enterprise, Delaware law
requires the board to show that there were "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to

corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and that the measure adopted was "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; see Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 927-28.
89. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Searchingfor the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit
Litigation:A Critiqueof Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962-63 (1982).

90. At times, these requirements may not be practical to implement on a rigorous basis. For
example, there may be compelling circumstances present that should permit counsel to represent
one of the subject entities before the expiration of the five-year period. Nonetheless, the burden
should be placed upon the party seeking an exception to the enumerated practices. The gist of the
practices is to help ensure, as much as feasible, that the board or a committee comprised of outside
directors receives separately retained advice that is of a high caliber. Although perfection is not
possible, any significant breach of the listed practices threatens the objectives sought to be
achieved by the proposed framework.
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Adherence to these suggested practices will reduce the potential for
bias and, at the same time, will not have an adverse effect in procuring
expert professional advice. Requiring that specially retained investment
bankers and counsel (such as the consultative attorney or counsel for the
outside directors) be selected by the outside directors, have no prior
affiliation with the pertinent "actors," have not continually proffered advice
favorable to management, and cannot thereafter be retained by the subject
entities for a substantial time period significantly increases the likelihood
that the board or committee will receive disinterested professional
assistance. Moreover, by channeling communications through counsel, 91 the
parties most directly interested will have less opportunity to exert undue
influence on a committee comprised of outside directors.
V.

CONCLUSION

It may be asserted that the proposals herein are too formalistic and seek
to implement a rigid monitoring mechanism. A survey of so-called
disinterested board and committee determinations belies this assertion. In
the aftermath of Enron and several other corporate debacles, one court
opined that it "is well aware of the questions now being raised in the
broader marketplace about the objectivity and responsibility of corporate
directors. 92 Indeed, proposals have been advanced that a corporation's
independent directors should have their own legal counsel on an ongoing
basis.93 Viewed from this perspective, the suggestions set forth herein
91. Hence the insiders can communicate in this context to the outside directors comprising
the committee only indirectly through the corporation's general counsel (or through the insiders'
separately retained counsel if that is the case) who, in turn, will communicate with counsel
advising the committee. This method of communication reduces the risk of undue influence by the
insiders.
92. In re PSE & G S'holder Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 320 (N.J. 2002).
93. See, e.g., Hazard & Rock, supra note 59, at 1392; see also James D. Cox, Managingand
Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors With Independent Counsel,
48 VILL. L. REv. 1077, 1088-95 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate
Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 449 (2003);
Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility,

59 BUS. LAW. 145, 157 (2003). As stated by the ABA Report:
There are times... when the corporate lawyer must recognize that his or her own
independence may be compromised by relationships with senior executive officers; at
such times, the lawyer's responsibility may require him or her to assure that the
corporate client retains other counsel who can exercise the requisite professional
detachment.
Id.Note, moreover, that under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a publicly-held corporation's audit
committee, which must be comprised solely of independent directors, has authority to retain its
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represent a relatively modest, yet meaningful, measure to help correct the
deficiencies that currently exist in the mergers and acquisitions area.

own counsel as the committee deems necessary to carry out its duties. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. II
2002)).

